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This Note considers the permissible uses of information secured through a FISA surveillance
in light of the fourth amendment issue raised by Falvey. It concludes that when information is
sought for purposes of national security or foreign affairs, the nature of the investigation and the
compelling government interest in obtaining the information require fourth amendment standards
in some respects different and lower than in ordinary criminal investigations.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE:
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OR PROSECUTION?
INTRODUCTION
During 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began
to investigate an international terrorist organization believed to be
operating in New York.' As part of its investigation, the FBI ob-
tained a warrant on April 3, 1981 authorizing the electronic surveil-
lance2 of two United States citizens, Thomas Falvey and George
Harrison, 3 pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
19784 (FISA or Act). 5 The surveillance continued until June 19 or
20 1981;6 Falvey and Harrison were then arrested and charged
with smuggling arms and equipment from the United States to the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland. 7
The government sought to use tapes of the intercepted tele-
phone conversations at trial.8 Pursuant to FISA requirements, the
government obtained the Attorney General's approval and in-
formed the defendants and the court of its intention to use those
tapes. 9 The government moved for an order under 50 U.S.C. §
1. United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. Id. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp.
II 1978), contains four separate definitions of electronic surveillance. The definitions vary
depending upon the type of communications or activities subject to surveillance, id. §
1801(0(3), (4), the type and location of the facility or premises to be monitored, id., and
whether a United States citizen or legal resident alien is a parteipant in the communications
or activities under investigation. Id. § 1801(f)(1), (2).
3. 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
4. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811.
5. 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
6. Id.
7. Id. The defendants Thomas Falvey, Michael Flannery, George Harrison, Patrick
Mullin and Daniel Gormley were indicted for conspiracy and numerous offenses relating to
the purchase of arms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976)(conspiracy to commit offense or
to defraud the United States), 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5842, 5845 (1976)(relating to the registra-
tion or identification of firearms), and 26 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976)(control of arms exports and
imports). 540 F. Supp. at 1307.
8. 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
9. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (Supp. II 1978), the government obtained the
advance authorization of the Attorney General to use the information in a criminal proceed-
ing. 540 F. Supp. at 1308. That provision is designed to ensure that the Attorney General has
an opportunity to prevent the disclosure in litigation of information that might jeopardize
national security interests. See H. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4060 [hereinafter cited as HousE CONFERENCE REPORT]. Prior
to trial, the government must notify the court and the person against whom the evidence will
be offered of its intention to disclose the information. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
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1806(f) ' 0 declaring that the surveillance had been conducted ac-
cording to FISA specifications and that the evidence therefore
would be properly admissible at trial."
The defendants responded with a motion to suppress the fruits
of the FISA surveillance on the grounds that FISA on its face and as
applied in this case, violated the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth
amendments and articles I and III of the Constitution. 2 The court
denied the defendants' motion and admitted the evidence. 13 The
court held that the surveillance had been conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the statute 14 and that the statute was consti-
tutional.' 5 United States v. Falvey was the first decision to consider
the constitutionality of FISA.' 6
10. The section provides that whenever a court or other authority is notified that the
information obtained pursuant to the surveillance will be offered as evidence or otherwise
disclosed at trial, the court will "review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and
such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the
surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted." 50 U.S.C. §
1806(f). Once such an affidavit is submitted, issues relating to the FISA surveillance can be
resolved only in a United States district court. If the case is already pending in federal district
court, it remains there for resolution of FISA issues. Id.
11. 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
12. Id. The only issue to be discussed in this Note will be the issue raised under the
fourth amendment. For the first amendment issue raised under FISA, see id. at 1314. For the
fifth and sixth amendment arguments, see id. at 1315. For the article I and III issues, see id.
at 1313 n.16.
13. Id. at 1316.
14. Specifically, the court found that the President authorized the Attorney General to
approve the application for the surveillance. Id. The application was made by a federal
officer and approved by the Attorney General. Id. The application contained the necessary
statements and the certifications were not clearly erroneous. Id. There was probable cause to
believe the targets, Falvey and Harrison, were agents of a foreign power, and this finding
was not based soley on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment. Id. There was
probable cause to believe that the facilities targeted were to be used by a foreign power. Id.
The minimization procedures employed were properly drawn. Id. Although the defendants
lost on the motion to suppress, they were subsequently acquitted at the jury trial.
15. Id.
16. 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). A second case that ruled on the constitutional-
ity of FISA is United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Belfield, the
defendants were charged with conspiracy to murder, accessory after the fact, grand larceny,
unauthorized use of a vehicle and perjury in connection with the assassination of Akbar
Tabatabai, president of the Iran Freedom Foundation. Id. at 141-42. Prior to the trial,
defendants requested disclosure of any electronic surveillance covering them. Id. at 142. The
government answered that each appellant was overheard on separate occasions during the
course of the electronic surveillance authorized by the United States FISA Court. Id. The
legality of the surveillance was determined ex parte after examination in camera. Id. The
defendants challenged the procedures on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Id. The
court of appeals held that the in camera, ex parte proceeding did not violate FISA provisions,
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The most serious constitutional issue raised by Falvey is
whether evidence obtained pursuant to a FISA warrant may be
used in the prosecution of a United States citizen without violating
the fourth amendment. This Note considers the permissible uses of
information secured through a FISA surveillance in light of the
fourth amendment issue raised by Falvey. It concludes that when
information is sought for purposes of national security or foreign
affairs, the nature of the investigation and the compelling govern-
ment interest in obtaining the information require fourth amend-
ment standards in some respects different and lower than in ordi-
nary criminal investigations.17
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS: ADJUSTMENT OF THE
PROCEDURES ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT
INTEREST INVOLVED
When the government conducts any type of search and sei-
zure, the fourth amendment requires that government interests be
balanced against the individual's privacy interests. 8 Generally, the
fourth amendment protects the individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring first, a warrant, and second, that
the issuance of the warrant be based on probable cause. 9
The purpose of the warrant process is to interpose a neutral
figure between the citizen and the law enforcement official to
nor did it violate the defendants' fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id. See also United States
v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
17. See infra notes 69-76, 99-104 and accompanying text.
18. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Court held:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States . . .
under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power. . . and to forever
secure the people. . . against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise
of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of a crime or not, and the
duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all . . . . The tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures. . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which
are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of
all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.
Id. at 50 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914)).
19. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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guarantee that the privacy of the individual will be disturbed only
after certain prescribed standards, including probable cause, have
been met.20 In the area of criminal investigation, the Supreme
Court has consistently stated that only exigent circumstances 21 or
consent22 will excuse approval by the impartial magistrate. In crim-
inal investigations, the magistrate must find probable cause to be-
lieve that a specific crime has been or is being committed before he
may issue a warrant.2 3 The probable cause requirement is intended
"to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy and unfounded charges of crime," and also to "give
fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. 24
"The rule of probable cause," declared the Court, "is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. '25
Thus, the fourth amendment balances privacy interests against
prosecutorial interests by requiring prior judicial authorization and
a strong showing of probable cause.
20. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948).
21. The Supreme Court has held that in certain situations exigent circumstances will
permit warrantless searches. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)(police may search
a movable vehicle for which the individual has a lessened expectation of privacy provided
probable cause and exigent circumstances are present); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 1
(1969) (police officer may conduct a search incident to lawful arrest in order to protect
himself and prevent destruction of the evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(stop and
frisk may be permitted where there is an immediate threat to the officers' safety); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(police may conduct a search without a warrant if there is
probable cause to believe that evidence in or on the individual's body is likely to disappear or
be destroyed).
22. The Supreme Court has held that a valid consent to search obviates the need to
obtain a warrant or to show that the police conduct was premised on probable cause.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEizuRE § 8.1 (1978).
23. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). In Beck, the
Court held that ommission of a warrant "bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of
an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Id. at 96.
24. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The nature or concept of
probable cause remains substantially the same as it was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Brinegar and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the Court held that
probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that an offense is being or
has been committed. Id. at 162.
25. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
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The fourth amendment compromise between competing inter-
ests need not always be maintained in precisely the same way.26 For
example, when the government gathers information for foreign
affairs and national security purposes, it is concerned with the
survival of the nation, an interest of higher priority than the prose-
cution of domestic crime. The government's interest in obtaining
timely, accurate information concerning the intentions and activi-
ties of foreign powers and international terrorist organizations does
not preempt fourth amendment rights but does require a balancing
of interests different from the balancing in criminal investigations.
That weighing of interests in intelligence gathering cases may not
always require prior judicial authorization and a strong showing of
probable cause.
Intelligence investigations detect and evaluate two types of
information: information "relating to the capabilities, intentions
and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons," 27 and
"information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage and other clandestine activities, sabotage, international
terrorist activities or assassinations.
2 8
Fourth amendment protections still apply to foreign affairs
and national security cases. The Court stated in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,29 that the presidential power in for-
eign affairs is "a power which ...like every other governmental
power must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provi-
sions of the Constitution.' 30 In United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court3 (Keith), the Court held that national security interests
26. There are certain investigative techniques that incorporate a different probable
cause test than the standard ordinarily used for arrests and searches. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court engaged in a "balancing" of the "need to search
against the invasion which the search entails" in adjusting the probable cause standard for
housing inspection warrants. Id. at 537. This balancing approach was subsequently used in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Court permitted a "stop and frisk" upon
information that fell short of probable cause to make a full fledged arrest and full search of
the person. Id. at 27. For a more complete analysis of these investigative techniques, see infra
notes 156-164 and accompanying text. See generally I W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.1
(1978).
27. Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 4-205, 3 C.F.R. 112, 133 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §
401 (Supp. 11 1978).
28. Id. § 4-202, 3 C.F.R. at 133 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 111978).
29. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
30. Id. at 320. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
31. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The case is referred to as Keith because Judge Damon R. Keith
presided over the case in the district court. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D.
Mich. 1971).
19831
506 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:501
did not render fourth amendment requirements inoperative and
would not justify warrantless electronic surveillance of a domestic
organization. 32
II. HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Despite the highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance,
both the judiciary and Congress were hesitant to recognize fourth
amendment protections in that area. Those two branches were even
more reticent to apply fourth amendment protections to national
security and foreign affairs cases.33 The Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the applicability of fourth amendment protections to elec-
tronic surveillance in the 1927 case of Olmstead v. United States.3 4
In Olmstead, the Court held that warrantless electronic sur-
veillance did not violate the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure because such surveillance
did not physically enter the constitutionally protected areas of the
house or the office.3 5 Six years later, Congress placed the first
restrictions on the use of electronic surveillance by enacting the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.36 Section 605 of the act made
it a crime for any person to intercept and divulge or publish the
32. The Court held that the use of "surveillance [is not] a welcome development even
when employed with restraint and under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a
deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon
cherished privacy of law abiding-citizens." 407 U.S. at 312. The Court continued that
although "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which ...the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance
.... Broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which
electronic surveillance entails necessitate Fourth Amendment safeguards." Id. at 313.
33. S. REP. No. 604, 95th. Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, 3908, 3909 [hereinafter cited as SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT.]. For a
detailed history of the development of electronic surveillance, see Note, The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78
MICH. L. REV. 1116 (1980); Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719 (1980).
34. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
35. Id. at 466. By a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court removed electronic
surveillance, unaccompanied by physical trespass, from the purview of constitutional super-
vision for nearly forty years. The Court did not apply the fourth amendment's requirement
that invasions of privacy occur only after a magistrate has issued a warrant based on probable
cause, despite Justice Brandeis' warning that "writs of assistance and general warrants are
but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping." Id. at
476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
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contents of wire and radio communications. 37 The Supreme Court
applied the statute to wiretapping by state and federal officials as
well as by private persons in Nardone v. United States (Nardone
I) .38 It further held that communications intercepted in violation of
the act were inadmissible in federal courts. 39 Finally, in Berger v.
New York40 and Katz v. United States,4' the Supreme Court recog-
nized that warrantless electronic surveillance conducted in criminal
investigations violated the fourth amendment.
42
Neither section 605, the Nardone I decision, nor the Berger
and Katz cases had an impact on the use of electronic surveillance
for purposes of national security. The Supreme Court exclusionary
rule applied only in criminal proceedings. Moreover, in 1940, Presi-
dent Roosevelt stated in a memorandum to the Attorney General
that section 605 and the Nardone I decision did not prohibit war-
rantless electronic surveillance involving the defense of the nation.
43
37. 47 U.S.C. § 605. The relevant provisions state:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any (wire or radio)
communications and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not
being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign
communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
Id.
38. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
39. In Nardone I, the Court found § 605 binding on law enforcement agents and barred
the introduction of wiretap records. Id. at 383. In Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939)(Nardone If), the Court barred the introduction of evidence derived from the wire-
tap. Id. at 340-43. The Justice Department soon adopted the view that since § 605 made it
unlawful to "intercept" and "divulge" communications, the act did not prohibit wiretapping
by agencies of the government if the information intercepted was disseminated only within
the government for law enforcement purposes. See Donner, Electronic Surveillance: The
National Security Game, Civ. LIB. REv., Summer 1975, at 15, 19.
40. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. The Berger case involved the constitutionality of a New York statute which autho-
rized eavesdropping for periods of up to 60 days based on a sworn statement that there was
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime would be obtained. 388 U.S. at 55-56.
The Court struck down the statute because, among other things, the 60 day authorization
permitted a series of searches and seizures based on one finding of probable cause. See infra
notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
In 1968, when the Court decided Katz, it finally recognized that the "underpinnings of
Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." 389 U.S. at 353. The Court held
that government officers must obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before employing
electronic surveillance in the course of any state or federal criminal investigation. Id. at 356.
43. Confidential Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson (May
21, 1940), reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673 app. (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Later presidents expanded the scope of national security surveil-
lance. 44 Even the Berger and Katz decisions disclaimed any intent
to extend their holdings to cases "involving national security." 45
In response to the Katz and Berger cases, Congress enacted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.46 Title III of
the act allows electronic surveillance only in cases involving speci-
fied serious crimes and imposes a warrant requirement for such
surveillance. 47 Title III, however, disclaims any congressional in-
tent to modify the President's authority "to obtain foreign intelli-
gence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. ' 4
The Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of
warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes
44. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk. II, at 36-38, 60-61, 105-06, 121-22
(1976). Although abuses of warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes
first came to public attention during the Watergate investigations of the Nixon Administra-
tion, the Church Committee concluded that such abuses predated the presidency of Richard
Nixon. Id. at 12. The Church Committee Report stated:
Since the early 1930's intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged
American citizens without the benefit of a judicial warrant. . . . [P]ast subjects of
these surveillances have included a United States Congressman, a Congressional
staff member, journalists and newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who
engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national
security ....
Id.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23. Three Justices briefly expressed their views on the
national security exception in concurring opinions. Justice White stated that the President's
inherent article II powers permitted warrantless electronic surveillance for national security
purposes. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Brennan
concurred, argued that the President and Attorney General could not act as disinterested
neutral magistrates because their duties to "investigate and prevent breaches of national
security" made it impossible for them to be impartial. Id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also Berger, 388 U.S. 41.
46. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-76 (1968)
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153-63 [hereinafter cited as TITLE III
SENATE REPORT]. Title III established procedures for government officials to follow in order to
secure warrants for electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520. In contrast to § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976), which
prohibited all persons from intercepting wire and radio communications in most circum-
stances, title III set standards for court approval of that type of surveillance. 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).
1983] FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
until 1972. Then, in Keith, the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment required prior judicial authorization for the electronic surveil-
lance of American citizens suspected of national security breaches. 49
The Court was not confronted with, and did not address, the
constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance in cases in-
volving a foreign power or its agent.50 That open question
prompted Congress to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.51 The Act prescribes standards and procedures for the
49. 407 U.S. at 321-24. The Keith case arose from a criminal proceeding in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The United States charged three
defendants with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
One of the defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of
the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 407 U.S. at 299. Plamondon sought
disclosure of the govetnment's electronic surveillance records and a hearing to determine
whether the government had used information from warrantless wiretaps to support the
indictment. Id. at 299-300. The government claimed that the warrantless surveillance was a
lawful exercise of presidential power to protect national security. Id. at 301. District Judge
Damon Keith ruled that the surveillance violated the fourth amendment and that records of
the wiretaps had to be disclosed. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-80 (E.D.
Mich. 1971). Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court order. United States v. United States District Court, 444
F.2d 651, 664-69 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297, 321-24 (1972). See infra notes 69-76
and accompanying text.
50. 407 U.S. at 321-22 n. 20. There has been tremendous confusion in case law and
statute as to the distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence gathering. In United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court analyzed the domestic
aspects of national security but did not address "the issues which may be involved with
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). Keith
added to the confusion surrounding national security. The Court emphasized that it was
difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign threats to the structure and existence of
the government. Id. at 309 n.8. The Court acknowledged that title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 uses "national security" to refer only to the activities of-
foreign powers. Id. § 2511(3). Nevertheless, the Court continued to apply the term national
security to both domestic and foreign intelligence operations. Keith, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8. In
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976), the court extended the holding in Keith and its warrant requirement to a wiretap of a
domestic organization that was not involved with a foreign power or foreign agent. Id. at
613-14. In a lengthy footnote, the court attempted to distinguish between domestic security
and foreign security. Id. at 613 n.42. The court, however, concluded " 'national security' will
generally be used interchangeably with 'foreign security' except where the context makes it
clear that it refers to both 'foreign security' and 'internal security.' " Id. On remand, the
district court established a different categorization and distinguished "domestic security,"
"domestic national security," and "foreign security" surveillances. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 444
F. Supp. 1296, 1299 n.3 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 606
F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. II
1978)). Three federal appellate courts have ruled on the constitutionality of warrantless
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. The Third and Fifth Circuits have held that
the executive branch has inherent constitutional power under article II to conduct such
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authorization of electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence investigations. 52 Due to the extreme secrecy and
protracted nature of such investigations, the procedures and proba-
ble cause standards embodied in the Act differ from the correspond-
ing requirements for criminal investigations under title III.
III. VARYING REQUIREMENTS OF PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Title III and Domestic Criminal Surveillance
Under ordinary law enforcement procedures not involving
electronic surveillance, a warrant will not issue unless there is
probable cause to believe that a specific crime has been, is being or
is about to be committed. 53 Furthermore, a judicial warrant must
be supported by an oath or affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 54 The
Court applied those standards to the use of electronic surveillance
in Berger v. New York. 55 New York's wiretapping statute had per-
mitted electronic surveillance if there were reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence of a crime would be obtained. 5 The Court
held that the "reasonable ground" requirement of the statute was
not equivalent to the probable cause standard of the fourth amend-
ment. 57 While the Court declared that " '[t]he requirements of the
surveillance. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub
nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). In a plurality opinion, the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia indicated that, absent exigent circumstances, the President must
obtain a warrant for all national security surveillance, domestic as well as foreign, conducted
within the United States. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 651. See infra note 76.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
53. The Supreme Court has held that: "'Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment
exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed." Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also FED. R. CM. P. 41. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure governs the issuance, content, execution and return of federal search
warrants. Id. Rule 41 requires: (1) a pre-issuance determination of probable cause; (2)
issuance only upon oath or affirmation in support of the probable cause showing; and (3)
particularity of description in the warrant of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Id.
55. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
56. Id. at 54-55.
57. Id. at 55.
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fourth amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the
legitimate needs of law enforcement,' s8 it is not asking too much
that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the
Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home or
office are invaded."'5 9 The Court concluded that law enforcement
investigations which employ covert electronic surveillance require
prior judicial authorization of the surveillance,60 particularity in
the application and order, 6 and a showing of probable cause that a
specific crime has been or is being committed.
6 2
Congress followed the dictates of Berger when it enacted title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.63
Title III provides that the magistrate must find that there is proba-
ble cause to believe that a particular crime has been or is being
committed.6 4 The statute effectuates that standard by requiring
that the application contain a "full and complete statement of the
facts . . . relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that (a
wiretap) order should be issued." 65 That statement must include
"details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is
about to be committed.""6 The statute requires that the application
specify the identity of the targeted person, the nature and location
of the facilities subject to surveillance and include a particular
description of the communications sought.67 Title III adequately
provided for the constitutional requirements of judicial authoriza-
tion, particularity and a finding of probable cause set out by the
Court in Berger.("
58. Id. at 63 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
59. 388 U.S. at 63.
60. According to the Court, New York's wiretapping statute did satisfy the fourth
amendment's requirement that a detached and neutral magistrate be interposed between the
police and the public. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 55. New York's statute was incompatible with the fourth amendment's
requirement of particularity. Id. The Court recognized that the need for particularity and
evidence of reliability was especially great in the case of electronic eavesdropping because it
involves an intrusion of privacy that is broad in scope. Id. at 55-56.
62. Id. at 54-55.
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). See TITLE III SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at
2153-63.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
65. Id. § 2518(1)(b).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2518(1)(b)(ii)-(iv).
68. Although the Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of title III as a
whole, it has held certain sections of the statute constitutional. See United States v. Giordano,
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B. Probable Cause: Keith and National Security Surveillance
In Keith, the Court noted that the presence of national security
considerations added elements to both sides of the fourth amend-
ment balance not present in ordinary criminal investigations.19 The
Court stated that, in national security cases, prior determination by
a magistrate is particularly important because "[n]ational security
cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth amend-
ment values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crime .... The dan-
ger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to
act under so vague a concept as the power to protect 'domestic
security.' "70 In addition, the Court noted that the fourth amend-
ment incorporates the historical judgment that unreviewed execu-
tive discretion may yield too readily to the pressures to obtain
incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy
and protected speech .71
While recognizing that the fourth amendment imposed a war-
rant procedure for electronic surveillance in national security
cases, 72 the Court acknowledged that domestic threats to national
security posed practical and policy considerations distinct from
those involved in ordinary criminal cases. 73 The Court noted that
warrant applications and orders may "vary according to the gov-
ernmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights
deserving protection. '74 The opinion stated that Congress is not
constitutionally obligated to maintain a probable cause standard
that called for evidence of criminal activity. The Court noted that
[t]he gathering of security intelligence is often long range and
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of infor-
mation. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more
difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many
416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974). Every appellate court
which has considered the issue has found the statute constitutional. See United States v.
Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v.
Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v.
Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1973).
69. 407 U.S. at 315-17.
70. Id. at 313-14.
71. Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 320.
73. Id. at 320-21.
74. Id. at 323.
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types of crime .... Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli-
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possi-
ble future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic sur-
veillance may be less precise than that directed against more
conventional types of crime .... It may be that Congress, for
example, would judge that the application and affidavit show-
ing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of
(Title III) but should allege other circumstances more appropri-
ate to domestic security cases .... 75
The Keith decision limited its discussion to the domestic aspects of
national security surveillance. However, the opinion contains noth-
ing to suggest that the same analysis would not be applicable to
cases of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence purposes.7 6
75. Id. at 322-23.
76. The distinction between domestic and foreign security is untenable. The govern-
ment itself, up to and including the arguments in Keith, asserted that the area was indivisi-
ble. It also maintained that if such distinction did exist, domestic organizations posed a
greater threat to the national security. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, RAISING AND LITIGAT-
ING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CLAIMS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 8.3(a) (1977). The government
has argued that "foreign and domestic affairs are inextricably intertwined and . . . any
attempt to legally distinguish the impact of foreign affairs from the matters of internal
subversive activities is an exercise in futility." United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504,
506 (D.D.C. 1971). The futility of distinguishing between these two categories and the abuses
which arise from such a categorization are illustrated in a set of cases, each dealing with the
identical set of wiretaps of the Jewish Defense League. Compare United States v. Huss, 482
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1973) and United States v. Smilow, 472 F.2d 1193 (2d Cir. 1973) (wiretap
categorized as surveillance involving the domestic aspects of national security) with Zweibon
v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973) (same tap categorized as surveillance involving
foreign threats to national security), rev'd and remanded, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(en
banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Despite the fact that the distinction is not useful and
generally confusing, several federal appellate courts have maintained the distinction between
the domestic and foreign threats to national security. Two of the circuit courts have found the
Keith analysis inapplicable to cases involving electronic surveillance for investigations involv-
ing foreign threats to the national security. In United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the President had authority "over and above the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment" to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. Id. at 426. The following year, in United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v.
United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1975), the Third Circuit held that prior approval of electronic
surveillance was not necessary. Post hoc determination of the legality of the particular
surveillance was adequate. Id. at 605. In contrast to the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), concluded that in the absence of
exigent circumstances, all foreign intelligence surveillances must be conducted pursuant to a
judicial warrant. Id. at 661.
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IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act regulates all elec-
tronic surveillance conducted within the United States for intelli-
gence gathering purposes." The statute classifies these intelligence
activities as positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
investigations. 78 It further classifies the object of a FISA surveil-
lance as a United States person, a foreign person or a foreign
power. 79 The FISA standards of specificity and probable cause
differ according to the nature of the investigation and its target.80
A. Foreign Intelligence Investigations
Pure foreign intelligence investigations may intentionally tar-
get only foreign powers, 81 and foreign persons acting as agents of a
foreign power.8 2 Such investigations aim solely at acquiring infor-
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. 11 1978).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B). The statute uses foreign intelligence to define both
positive foreign intelligence relating to national defense and foreign affairs, and counterintel-
ligence relating to clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage and international terrorism.
However, the the legislative history defines information relating to national defense and
foreign affairs as foreign intelligence. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 3978.
Information relating to clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage and interna-
tional terrorism is referred to as counterintelligence information. Id. at 3979.
79. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a), (b), (c).
80. If the target of the surveillance is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign
power," who is not a "United States person," there is no requirement of evidence of criminal-
ity. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A). However, before a "United States person" may be targeted for
surveillance as an agent of a foreign power, the government must establish probable cause to
believe that the person's activities "involve" or "may involve" a violation of federal criminal
law. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A); id. § 1801(b)(2).
81. A foreign power is defined as:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by
the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments
to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign based political organization, not substantially composed of United
States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or govern-
ments.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)-(6).
82. An agent of a foreign power is defined as:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
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mation relating to the capabilities, activities and intentions of for-
eign powers, organizations or persons. 83 With the exception of
emergency surveillance8 4 and limited surveillance of an "official
foreign power," 8 5 all foreign intelligence must be authorized by a
warrant issued by a judge of the special FISA court.86
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a
member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence
activities in the United States . . .or when such person knowingly aids or abets
any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve
a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are
in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowlingly conspires with any person to
engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
83. Section 401 of title 50 defines foreign intelligence as information relating to the
capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons. 50 U.S.C. §
401. The definition of foreign intelligence contained in FISA is less explicit but in accord with
§ 401. FISA defines foreign intelligence as information with respect to a foreign power that
relates to the national defense or security of United States or to the conduct of foreign affairs.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2).
84. If the Attorney General determines that the basis for a FISA warrant exists but
because of an emergency the surveillance must be conducted before an application can be
made, the Attorney General may authorize the surveillance and notify a FISA court judge
that he is doing so. Emergency surveillance is permitted for 24 hours at the maximum. 50
U.S.C. § 1805(e).
85. The President may authorize the Attorney General to approve a FISA surveillance
for up to one year without a court order. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1). The certification must state
that the surveillance is targeted against a "means of communication used exclusively between
or among" official foreign powers or against non-verbal "technical intelligence ... from
property or premises under the open and exclusive control of" an official foreign power. Id. §
1802(a) (I)(A) (i)-(ii).
86. Id. § 1803. The Chief Justice must publicly appoint seven district court judges from
seven of the United States judicial circuits. Id. § 1803(a). The district judges will have
exclusive jurisdiction to receive FISA applications and issue FISA warrants. Id. The Chief
Justice must also designate an appeals court of three judges to hear government appeals if the
district court denies the first order. Id. § 1803(b). If the appeals court affirms the lower
court's denial of the FISA warrant, the government may petition the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. Id.
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An application for a foreign intelligence warrant must meet
the following technical requirements. It must identify the federal
officer making the application, confirm the authority conferred
upon the Attorney General by the President, and include the Attor-
ney General's approval of the application.87 In addition, the appli-
cation must describe the means by which the surveillance is to be
effected and whether physical entry is required. 88
1. Specificity
The specificity requirements embodied in FISA closely parallel
those of ordinary criminal investigations. The warrant application
and order must specify the target of the surveillance, describe in
detail the information sought and clarify the period of time during
which the surveillance may be conducted. 89 The application must
also include a certification by a designated official of the executive
branch stating that the purpose of the intelligence is to obtain
foreign intelligence information of a specific type which could not
be obtained through normal investigative techniques. 0 However,
in determining whether the stated purpose of the surveillance will
be achieved, the magistrate cannot go beyond the facts described in
the certification to evaluate the necessity of the surveillance.9 ' The
application must also specify minimization procedures which limit
the interception, acquisition and dissemination of conversations of
United States persons who are not the authorized targets of the
surveillance.9 2 If, for example, an American spoke with a foreign
87. Id. § 1804(a)(l)-(2).
88. Id. § 1804(a)(8). The warrant itself must also state the means by which the surveil-
lance is to be effected and whether physical entry is required. Id. § 1805(b)(1)(D).
89. The applications for court orders are governed by § 1804. Id. § 1804(a)(3), (6), (10).
Requirements for the issuance of the court orders are contained in § 1805. Id. §
1805(b)(1)(A)-(E).
90. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(A)-(D). S. Rae. No. 701, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3973, 4020-21 [hereinafter cited as SENATE INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT].
91. In determining whether the articulated purpose will be achieved by the wiretap-
ping, the magistrate cannot go beyond the certification to evaluate the necessity of the
surveillance. The judge must take the reasons for the surveillance asserted in the application
as true. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3978.
92. Minimization procedures provide safeguards for the acquisition, retention and dis-
semination of information about a United States person only, whether they are the inten-
tional target of the surveillance or whether they are overheard accidentally. 50 U.S.C. §
1801(h). Section 1801(h)(1) includes the most explicit definition of minimization. It requires
that "specific procedures be adopted ... that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose
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official who was under surveillance for purposes unrelated to the
conversation, 93 the minimization procedures would limit the re-
cording of those communications in order to avoid unnecessary
intrusion.9 4
The statute's requirement of particularity in the application
and order comports with constitutional mandates.9 5 In Keith, the
Supreme Court held that the application and order for domestic
security surveillance could be less specific as to the identity of its
targets and the nature of the information sought than the applica-
tion and order required for criminal investigations.9 By incorporat-
ing specificity requirements followed in criminal investigations,
Congress mandated a higher standard than the Court did in
Keith. 7
2. Probable Cause
In order for a foreign intelligence surveillance to be approved,
the judge must find that the application establishes probable cause
to believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or a
and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquistion and retention, and
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons. ... Id. § 1801(h)(1). Minimizing acquisition under FISA is equiva-
lent to minimizing interception of the information. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE RE-
Powr, supra note 90, at 4009. Minimizing retention requires the government to destroy the
information where feasible, and render it essentially non-usuable if destruction is not feasible.
Id. Minimizing dissemination involves restricting access to the information while its rele-
vancy is determined. Once it is determined that the information is relevant, dissemination is
restricted to agencies, and to those officials within an agency with a need to know. Id. at
4010. For an extensive analysis of minimization procedures, see Schwartz, Oversight of
Minimization Compliance Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watch-
dogs are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405 (1981).
93. See SENATE COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 90, at 4008. In assessing
the minimization effort, the court's role is to determine whether "on the whole, the agents
have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all they could to avoid
unnecessary intrusion." Id. at 4008-09.
94. Id. at 4009-10.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. 407 U.S. at 322.
97. 388 U.S. 41. The Congress went beyond the Keith requirements to satisfy the
standards established for surveillance in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger,
the Court required that the warrant particularly describe the conversations or communica-
tions to be intercepted and not merely furnish the name or identity of persons whose
conversations were to be seized. Id. at 55-59. Berger also held that the duration of surveil-
lance needed to be explicitly stated in the application as well. Id. For a complete discussion of
the Berger requirements, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
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foreign person acting as an agent of a foreign power. FISA, in
contrast to criminal investigations, does not require a showing of
criminal activity before electronic surveillance can be used in a
foreign intelligence investigation. 8
The purpose of the probable cause standard in a criminal
investigation is to ensure that government intrusions occur only
when there are articulable facts and evidence indicating criminal
activity. 99 However, where the government's need to intrude on
individual privacy is based on national security intelligence gather-
ing, the Supreme Court recognized in Keith that "[d]ifferent stan-
dards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government
for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citi-
zens." 100
Elimination of the probable cause showing of criminal activity
for foreign intelligence surveillance comports with the Supreme
Court's holding in Keith. 10 Although most often formulated in
terms of an officer's probable cause to believe that criminal activity
has or will take place, the standard may be modified when the
government interest compels an intrusion based on something other
than a reasonable belief of criminal activity. 0 2 The government
undertakes electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
with no suspicion that evidence of criminal activity may be discov-
ered. Requiring the government agents to show that they have a
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
99. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
100. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323. The gathering of information about foreign powers and
their relations with this country serves an important purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Clay,
430 F.2d 165, 172 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). "Undoubt-
edly, certain kinds of foreign security information surpass in value to the Government any
information about ordinary crime or domestic subversion: information concerning the likeli-
hood of preemptive nuclear attack, for example, or the theft of vital military secrets." Note,
Foreign Security Surveillance, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 984 (1974).
101. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23.
102. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3978-79. Only a small
percentage of intelligence investigations conducted against foreign powers are aimed at
gathering evidence of criminal activity. Many intelligence professionals believe that criminal
prosecutions should never be brought against hostile agents because doing so will only result
in their replacement by other, unknown agents. Moreover, criminal proceedings will not only
confirm the accuracy of classified information that has been passed to a foreign power, but
may also reveal some of the material to a far wider audience. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECURITY SECRETS AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (Comm. Print 1978).
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reasonable belief that criminal activity will be unearthed ignores
the overriding purpose of the surveillance.
FISA provisions regulating surveillance in positive foreign in-
telligence investigations comport with fourth amendment guaran-
tees. The statute requires prior approval by a district court judge
based upon a description of specific targets and a showing of proba-
ble cause appropriate to the nature of the investigation. 0 3 The
executive branch must take into account the characteristics of the
foreign power, the identity of the foreign agent, the risks involved
in the surveillance, and the relevance of the information sought to
the fulfillment of proper intelligence needs. 10 4 FISA also requires
prior judicial authorization and probable cause that the target is a
foreign power or a foreign agent. The elimination of a probable
cause showing of criminal activity is entirely appropriate in the
foreign intelligence context where the use of the intercepted com-
munications is for informational purposes only and where the ab-
sence of criminal activity is irrelevant to the purpose of the surveil-
lance.
B. Counterintelligence Investigations
Counterintelligence investigations are distinct from foreign in-
telligence investigations in scope and purpose. Counterintelligence
surveillances intentionally target "United States persons"10 5 as well
as foreign persons and powers. The purpose of such investigations is
to protect against the commission of serious crimes such as espio-
nage, sabotage, assassination, kidnapping and terrorists acts com-
mitted by or on behalf of foreign powers. 06
Information gathering and law enforcement tend to merge in
counterintelligence investigations, in contrast to foreign intelligence
investigations which target information about the intentions and
capabilities of foreign powers. FISA establishes procedures for the
use of counterintelligence information in subsequent criminal pros-
ecutions against United States citizens and resident aliens.10 7 The
intentional targeting of United States persons and the overlap with
103. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(4), 1805(a)(3)(A).
104. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3979.
105. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). A United States person is defined as a citizen of the United
States, a legal resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of citizens
or resident aliens, or a United States corporation incorporated in this country. Id.
106. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A)-(D).
107. Id. § 1806(a)-(j).
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law enforcement requires a careful balancing of the government's
need to gather intelligence information and its interest in prevent-
ing the commission of serious crimes against fourth amendment
privacy interests.
All electronic surveillance conducted for counterintelligence
investigations requires prior judicial authorization with the excep-
tion of emergency surveillance. 108 The technical requirements of the
warrant procedure, such as disclosing the identity of the federal
officer making the application and confirming the authority con-
ferred by the President on the Attorney General, are identical to the
technical procedures for foreign intelligence surveillances.109 The
application must also include a certificate stating that the purpose
of the surveillance is to obtain counterintelligence information of a
specific type that cannot be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques. In contrast to foreign intelligence investigations, the judge
is authorized to evaluate the sufficiency of the factual statement to
insure that it is not clearly erroneous. 11°
1. Specificity
As with foreign intelligence probes, the warrant application
and order must specify the target of the surveillance, describe in
detail the information sought and clarify the period of time during
which the surveillance may be conducted."' These provisions of
FISA fulfill the requirements of the fourth amendment, reaching
beyond the standards for national security investigations established
in Keith to satisfy the requirements for domestic criminal investiga-
tions in Berger."2
2. Probable Cause
A United States citizen or resident alien may be classified as a
foreign agent and hence, intentionally targeted in a FISA surveil-
108. For a discussion of emergency surveillance, see supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
109. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
110. If the target of the surveillance is a United States person, the judge may evaluate
whether the statements in the certification are clearly erroneous. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5). The
statements will relate to the foreign intelligence information and the need of the surveillance.
Id. The judge can request further information from the applicant to make this determination.
Id. § 1804(d).
111. The application procedures are governed by 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)-(d). The warrant
procedures are governed by 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)-(d).
112. For a detailed discussion of the Berger requirements, see supra notes 55-62 and
accompanying text.
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lance, if he knowingly engages in various clandestine activities for a
foreign power and if the activities "involve or may involve" a
violation of criminal law.11 3 FISA divides such activities into four.
categories: "clandestine intelligence gathering activities,""14 "other
clandestine activities,"" 5 "sabotage, terrorism or preparation there-
for," 1" and aiding, abetting, or conspiring with an agent of a
foreign power. " 7 By establishing that the target's activities fall into
one of these subdivisions, the government officer asserts the target is
113. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2).
114. The statute does not precisely define clandestine intelligence gathering. However,
the application must show that the target is aware that he is acting for or on behalf of a
foreign power's intelligence network. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REIORT, supra note
90, at 3990. In addition, the activities in question must be ones which involve or may involve
a violation of the criminal law. Id. at 3990-91. Most often the laws in question will be the
criminal espionage statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799; id. § 951 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2272-
2278(b) (1976); 50 U.S.C. § 855 (1976). Id. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 90, at 3990-91. The definition would also include the collection of industrial or techno-
logical information which, if disclosed to a hostile foreign nation might threaten national
security. Id. In such situations the activity might violate federal law prohibiting the interstate
transportation of stolen property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). Id. SENATE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3990-91. The activity may include covert actions
designed by an intelligence service of a foreign power to influence events in this country. Id.
But such covert actions must involve a present or imminent violation of federal criminal law
such as 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (bribery of public officials and witnesses). SENATE INTELLE-
CENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3993-95.
115. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(B). Under this category, the person must not only have a
knowing and substantial connection with the foreign power, but he must be acting pursuant
to the direction of a foreign intelligence service or network. See SENATE INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3993-95.
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c), (d). The statute defines sabotage as "activities that involve a
violation of chapter 105 of title 18, or would involve such a violation if committed against the
United States." 50 U.S.C. 1801(d). For the activities that violate chapter 105 of title 18, see
18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2157 (1976).
International terrorism is defined as activities that
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended
to intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(3).
117. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(D). This section requires the government to establish
probable cause that the prospective target knows both that the person with whom he is
conspiring or whom he is aiding and abetting is engaged in the described activities as an agent
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acting as an agent of a foreign power and is involved in activities
which may violate the criminal law.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Insufficiency of the Probable Cause Standard for
Counterintelligence Investigations
When surveillance is used solely to collect foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence for informational purposes only, a showing
of criminal activity is simply irrelevant. Accordingly, fourth
amendment procedures may be adjusted to omit a showing of
criminal activity usually required to justify a search."i8 Even where
the government targets a United States citizen simply to obtain
information concerning clandestine intelligence activities such as
espionage, sabotage, kidnapping or assassination, FISA's "may in-
volve" a criminal violation standard"" gives sufficient fourth
amendment protection when the information is not used in the
prosecution of that citizen. However, when the purpose of the
counterintelligence surveillance is to gather incriminating evidence,
the government has a dual interest: preventing breaches in national
security and prosecuting the individual. Thus, the appropriate bal-
ance between the government's interests and individual privacy lies
nearer to routine criminal investigation standards. Accordingly,
when the government institutes electronic surveillance of a United
States person and intends to use evidence derived from that surveil-
lance to prosecute him, 120 the government should be required to
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe the individual
committed or is committing a specific crime.
of a foreign power and that his own conduct is assisting or furthering such activities. SENATE
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 90, at 3997.
118. In Keith, the Court recognized that domestic security surveillance may involve
policy and practical considerations that differ from those involved in the surveillance of
ordinary crime. 407 U.S. at 322. The exact targets of the surveillance are more difficult to
identify than in ordinary criminal surveillance, and the focus of the surveillance may be less
precise as well. Id. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "may involve"
probable cause standard.
120. Intent to prosecute can be deduced from the timing and subsequent use of the
information. The courts and law enforcement officials acknowledge that prosecutorial pur-
pose is a common element in counterintelligence investigations. See infra notes 125-27.
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B. Falvey: Misuse of FISA
The Falvey case is a clear example of the use of counterintelli-
gence information as evidence in a criminal prosecution. The tim-
ing of the surveillance indicated prosecutorial intent. According to
the Appellant's Brief, by December 23, 1980, a criminal investiga-
tion was directed at George Harrison.' 21 It was not until April 3,
1981, however, that the government instituted electronic surveil-
lance of defendants Falvey and Harrison pursuant to FISA.122 The
surveillance continued until June 19th or 20th of that same year
when the defendants were arrested.1 23 The government used the
information intercepted as evidence to support the subsequent ar-
rest and indictment of the defendants for offenses relating to the
alleged purchase of arms and ammunition for shipment to the Irish
Republican Army. 124
The use of intelligence information for prosecutorial purposes
is not unique to Falvey. Courts and law enforcement officials have
indicated that intelligence investigations of United States citizens
often involve prosecutorial purposes. 12 5 Indeed, the court in United
States v. Humphrey1 28 recognized that the government would
rarely engage in electronic surveillance of a citizen without plans to
prosecute at some time. 27
The defendants argued that FISA was misused in their case
because the government was primarily gathering incriminating evi-
dence by the time the surveillance was instituted. 2 Accordingly,
the defendants asserted that the government should therefore have
complied with procedures of title III requiring a probable cause
121. Brief for Appellant at 31, United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
122. 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1307.
125. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982) (statement of Griffin Bell, Att'y Gen: "Let me say that every
one of these counterintelligence investigations involved. . . [or] involves crime in an inciden-
tal way. You never know when you might turn up with something you might want to
prosecute.").
126. 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978).
127. Id. at 56.
128. Id. at 1313. In the brief, the appellants argued that FISA could not properly
authorize seizure of the conversations where the purpose of the surveillance was criminal
investigation. Accordingly, the requirements of and prohibitions contained in title III should
prevail. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 121, at 33.
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showing of a specific crime before the warrant was issued. 29 In
dismissing the defendant's assertion, the court conceded that the
argument was "not without appeal." 130
The FISA probable cause standard for counterintelligence in-
vestigations of United States persons is insufficient when the pur-
poses of the investigation include criminal prosecution. First,
FISA's "may involve a criminal violation" standard permits surveil-
lance based on the mere possibility of criminal activity, a standard
that violates conventional criminal procedure.13 ' Second, the stat-
ute does not indicate the particular offenses for which surveillance
may be instituted. To regulate electronic surveillance for use in
criminal prosecution, a statute should enumerate the specific crimes
for which the surveillance may be used.
Standard fourth amendment law requires a probable cause
showing of the commission or imminent commission of a particular
offense. 132 By requiring that the government only establish conduct
that "may involve a criminal violation,"133 FISA's probable cause
standard lacks both the specificity and imminence needed for the
issuance of a warrant in a criminal investigation. The "may in-
volve" standard permits surveillance upon a finding of probable
cause to believe in the mere possibility rather than the existence of
criminal activity. FISA requires that the government only assert
generalized rather than specific criminal activity. Finally, the stat-
ute permits the government to allege that the criminal activity will
take place in the indefinite rather than the immediate future. Thus,
a FISA application and order not only require less information
129. 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
130. Id. In Falvey, the court recognized that several courts have ruled that, while
warrantless electronic surveillance was permissible to obtain foreign intelligence information,
in no case was it permitted as an excuse for, or with the intention of obtaining evidence of
criminal activity. Id. at 1313. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d
Cir. 1974)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1975).
Although well aware in both Truong and Butenko of the importance of an executive in-
formed of accurate information concerning national security, neither court was willing to
forego traditional fourth amendment requirements of prior judicial authorization and proba-
ble cause when circumstances indicate that the government is indeed looking for incriminat-
ing evidence and not information vital to the defense of the nation. Truong, 629 F.2d at 912-
13; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606.
131. See supra notes 18-26, 53-68 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
133. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(B).
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pertaining to the criminal activity involved, but also permit surveil-
lance upon mere speculation that at some point in the indefinite
future the individual may violate the law.
In addition to the vague phrasing of the probable cause stan-
dard, FISA does not contain a listing of specific criminal laws. FISA
is not primarily a tool for prosecuting crime;134 the statute merely
explains the proper focus of foreign intelligence and counterintelli-
gence investigations without specifying the related national security
offenses. A statute authorizing electronic surveillance for prosecuto-
rial purposes should be limited to a list of crimes for which surveil-
lance is an appropriate investigative device.1 35 If FISA is used to
obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, the government will be
able to employ electronic surveillance without limiting its use to the
investigation of particular, serious offenses.
Use of electronic surveillance to fulfill prosecutorial needs re-
quires a probable cause showing of the commission or imminent
commission of a specific crime listed in the statute because of the
highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance. In investigations
not involving electronic surveillance, a warrant authorizes one sin-
gle, overt entry and search of specific premises. 36 In contrast,
electronic surveillance usually involves the interception of many
conversations over an extensive period of time. 1 37 Electronic surveil-
lance thus results in a general search of private conversations.
38
The Supreme Court has recognized that investigative activities
that are especially intrusive require a higher probable cause thresh-
old. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 39 the Court noted that the
134. See SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 33, at 3957.
135. See infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
136. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 6 (1978).
137. Although the minimization procedures apply to limit the interception of wire
communications, electronic surveillance looms as the ultimate invasion of privacy. Id. § 7.
When the police execute a warrant, they are looking for a particular item and must limit
their search accordingly. Id. However, the government must necessarily listen to numerous
conversations in their entirety in order to determine whether or not they are significant. Id.
§§ 6-7. Under the authority of a single warrant, the government may conduct a series of
surrepticious intrusions. Id.
138. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the
Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the of the Select Comm. on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978). Even when a tap is
placed on a person suspected of engaging in criminal activity, it offends the fourth amend-
ment because it necessarily results in a general search of all private conversations, incriminat-
ing or not. Id.
139. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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degree of justification for a search depended on the scope of the
invasion.140 In Berger v. New York,1 41 Justice Stewart noted in his
concurring opinion:
I would hold that the affidavits on which the judicial order
issued in this case did not constitute a showing of probable cause
adequate to justify the authorizing order. The need for particu-
larity and evidence of reliability in the showing required when
judicial authorization is sought for the kind of electronic eaves-
dropping involved in this case is especially great. The standard
of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands
that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion.
By its very nature electronic eavesdropping for a 60-day period,
even of a specified office, involves a broad invasion of constitu-
tionally protected area. Only the most precise and rigorous stan-
dard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort. 42
Justice Stewart concluded that the evidence "was constitutionally
insufficient to constitute probable cause to justify an intrusion of
the scope and duration that was permitted in this case." 143
C. Title III: The Appropriate Standard
When the government institutes electronic surveillance for
prosecutorial purposes, it should meet the standards of title III for
three reasons. First, Congress intended title III as a prosecutorial
tool in contrast to FISA which was not primarily intended for use in
criminal investigations. 44 Second, the scope of title III covers the
use of electronic surveillance in investigations relating to espionage
and sabotage. 145 Third, title III recognizes the extremely intrusive
nature of electronic surveillance and requires a stringent standard
of probable cause.146
Title III governs and was intended to govern the use of elec-
tronic surveillance to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions. 47
140. Id. at 535-36.
141. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
142. Id. at 69.
143. Id. at 70.
144. See TITLE III SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 2157-58; SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 33, at 3957.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1976).
146. Id. § 2518(3)(a)-(d). Before the judge will issue a warrant, he must be satisfied that
"there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a particular offense enumerated in § 2516 of this chapter." Id. § 2518(3) (a).
147. Id. §§ 2510-2520. See TITLE III SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 2157-58, 2185-
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Section 2516 of title III enumerates the specific criminal violations
that may necessitate the use of electronic surveillance as a part of
the investigative process.1 48 That substantial list includes: espio-
nage, treason, kidnapping, presidential assassination, interstate
transport of stolen property and sabotage. Thus, title III would
have applied to the crimes suspected in the Falvey case 49 and to
others that fall within the counterintelligence category.15 0 FISA is
concerned with threats to national security that emanate from a
foreign power and implicate foreign persons and United States
persons.' 5 ' To the extent that FISA is used to obtain information for
its informational value only, its standards are sufficient for surveil-
lance of foreign citizens and powers, and United States persons. 152
Using FISA as a prosecutorial tool substitutes unintended and in-
adequate standards for the appropriate standards of title III. Thus,
where the government intentionally targets United States persons to
gather evidence for prosecution, the use of title III implements
congressional intent and safeguards fourth amendment freedoms. 
5 3
Furthermore, conducting electronic surveillance according to title
III standards is appropriate because it recognizes the extremely
intrusive nature of the surveillance. Title III does not permit the use
of electronic surveillance unless the warrant application establishes
probable cause to believe a specific offense listed in section 2516 of
the act, has been, is being, or is about to be committed.1
5 4
The Supreme Court has sanctioned searches and seizures with-
out a finding of probable cause in certain prescribed circum-
stances. 15 However, the rationale allowing those departures from
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
149. Several provisions appear applicable: unlawful use of explosives, theft from inter-
state shipment, interstate transportation of stolen property, racketeer influenced and corrupt
organizations or indeed, espionage or sabotage. Id. § 2516(1)(a), (c).
150. FISA counterintelligence investigations may involve the following violations under
§ 2516: espionage, treason, kidnapping, presidential assassination, sabotage, or bribery of
public officials.
151. The definition of "foreign agent" indicates that the surveillance is to be directed at
a foreign person who "acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power,"
or against any person who "acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in
clandestine intelligence activities in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (Supp. II
1978). For a complete definition of a foreign power, see supra note 81.
152. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the appropriate fourth amendment procedures for the use of
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations, see supra notes 55-68, 144-52.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1976).
155. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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fourth amendment requirements is inappropriate when the govern-
ment employs electronic surveillance in criminal investigations.
The Court carved out exceptions for the permissible departure from
a finding of probable cause in Camara v. Municipal Courtl"" and
Terry v. Ohio. 5 7 In Camara the Supreme Court sanctioned the use
of area warrants for municipal authorities to conduct housing code
investigations. 5 8 Camara approved the use of an area wide search
warrant without proof of particular violation because the inspec-
tions were neither "personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of
evidence of a crime." 59 They involved a rather limited invasion of
the citizens' privacy and were justified because of the necessity of
locating and abating hazards to public health.160 In Terry v.
Ohio,'' the Court concluded that a police officer could conduct a
"stop and frisk" based on something less than probable cause of
criminal activity. 6 2 The Court held that a stop and frisk for weap-
ons could take place if there was reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.6 3 Use of a stop and frisk under circumstances admittedly
short of probable cause was permitted because of the public interest
in protecting the police officer and the limited scope of the
search. 4
The reasoning used in Camara and Terry is inapplicable to
investigations that use electronic surveillance for counterintelli-
gence purposes. Both cases involved limited invasions of privacy,
either as part of a regulatory scheme or as a means of protecting the
safety of the police officer. In contrast to those limited invasions,
electronic surveillance is perhaps the most intrusive form of search
and seizure. It is a more drastic interference than the searches and
seizures conducted pursuant to a routine search warrant. Since no
one can accurately predict when the incriminating evidence will be
communicated, the surveillance must continue for a significant
duration in contrast to the limited temporal intrusion granted by an
ordinary search warrant for tangible things.
156. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
157. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
158. 387 U.S. at 535-36.
159. Id. at 537.
160. Id. at 533.
161. 392 U.S. (1968).





Surveillance for counterintelligence purposes inevitably and
inextricably involves a policy of criminal law enforcement. 15 When
the purpose of a counterintelligence investigation is to gather in-
criminating evidence for prosecution, the standard of probable
cause must reflect the balance between the government's interest in
prosecution and the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The probable cause standard must reflect the
preeminence of the individual's right to privacy in a criminal inves-
tigation which employs such intrusive measures as electronic sur-
veillance. Thus, when the use of electronic surveillance is part of a
counterintelligence investigation that intends criminal prosecution,
the surveillance should be conducted in compliance with the stan-
dards and requirements of title III.
Christine A. Burke
165. Note, The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HAv. L. REV. 1130,
1263-64 (1972). See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 n.5 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 56
(E.D. Va. 1978); see also supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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